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JUDICIAL REVIEW SEEN FROM A MEXICAN
PERSPECTIVE
Lic. Carlos del Ri'o Rodriguez*
THE SPANISH TRADITION AND THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON
MEXICO
Historically Mexico practiced a mixture of the Spanish
"audiencia" and Supreme Tribunal, with the novel constitutional
juridical trend represented by the "Judicial Review" of the United
States of America. If to the foregoing we add the cultural peculiar-
ities of Mexico, its confusing and troubled history and the influence
of other judicial trends on our constituents, particularly the French
influence, we will begin to understand the reason for the complex
development of Mexico's legal system and judicial branch of
government.
First I would like to make perfectly clear that the frequently re-
peated assertion found in text books on constitutional law, both by
Mexicans and foreigners, that the Mexican constituents of 1825
copied the badly translated copy of the United States Constitution
that Stephen F. Austin brought to Mexico when he requested per-
mission to colonize Coahuila-Texas, is erroneous. In 1824 Mexico
already had a rich constitutional tradition that could serve as a ba-
sis for drawing up the new constitution, among the constituents
were men who had taken part in the Congress that drew up the
Constitution of Cddiz of 1812 and others who had participated in
the writing of the Constitution of Apatzingan of 1814 and they ob-
viously had parliamentary experience in constitutional matters.
Furthermore, Mexico's founding fathers did not copy the Ameri-
can Constitution as anyone who has read the two documents can
readily observe. A comparison between the 1787 Constitution of
Philadelphia and that of Mexico of 1824, demonstrates that there
are important differences between them. The founding fathers
adopted the lockean notion of popular sovereignty perhaps wary of
parliamentary power, while in Mexico the members of the Constit-
uent Congress of 1824, as well as that of 1814, considered that
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sovereignty is exercised essentially by the legislative power, in the
manner of the French National Assemblies.
The two documents also differ as to who are citizens: the Mexi-
can Federal Constitution of 1824 considered citizens every person
born or naturalized in Mexico, while the American Constitution did
not define the nature and prerogatives of citizens until the XIV
Amendment, without recognizing, even then, the Native Ameri-
cans, the Indians, as citizens.
Another point: the Philadelphia Constitution tolerated and ac-
cepted slavery, while it had been totally abolished in Mexico since
the time of Hidalgo, on December 6, 1810.
These and other differences that could be listed take second place
when faced with the main issue: the Mexican judicial system pro-
vided for in the Constitution of 1824 and the legislation in force at
that time cannot be traced to the system conceived by the founding
fathers at Philadelphia for the emerging nation of the American
Continent.
From the consummation of Independence in 1821 and until the
second half of the nineteenth century, the laws existing in Mexico
were applied with the following priority:
1. The Laws and decrees of the Mexican Congress.
2. The Decrees and laws of the Spanish Courts in force prior to
Independence.
3. The Royal Provisions of Spain called "Novisimas."
4. The Spanish New Digest Laws.
5. The Digest Laws.
6. The Spanish Laws on Royal Jurisdictions and Judgment.
7. The Statutes and Municipal Jurisdictions of each city "Insofar
as they are not contrary to God or reason."
8. The "Partidas"; laws given by the Spanish King, Alfonso X
"The Wise." As of 1824, when a Federal system similar to
that of the United States of America was adopted, these were,
so to speak, federal laws applicable in the entire territory.
It must be pointed out that among the Spanish Laws of impor-
tance both to Mexico and the rest of Hispanic America, is the Con-
stitution of Cdidiz of-1812 and the liberal laws given by the
"Courtes" (Congress) during the War against France in the Napo-
leonic Period.
Spain and its colonies were ruled by the Constitution of Cddiz
when Mexico achieved its independence in 1921. It provided for the
creation of a Supreme Court, which basically was a Court for polit-
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ical pleas of top public officials' liabilities, following the Hispanic
tradition of the so-called "impeachment proceedings," but lacking
the powers to revise the constitutionality of the laws since they
could only advise concerning the "prudence" of issuing them.
In the colonies, the old Royal Tribunal became, according to the
Constitution of Cddiz, a "Territorial Tribunal" involved strictly in
imparting justice in agreement with the principle of separation of
powers. The Mexican deputy, JosE Sim6n de Uria of Guadalajara
(New Galicia), said in the Courts of Cadiz, that "one of the main
purposes of the constitution is to ensure for the Nation an honest,
prompt, effective and impartial administration of justice."
A Cddiz law of the same year, 1812, regulated the functions of
the tribunals and also the appeal or proceeding of nullity,
equivalent to the Cassation Law of France. Thus, when Mexico be-
came independent in 1821, the Court that was in fact functioning
in Mexico was the Tribunal ("Audiencia") with the functions of a
court of appeals and of cassation in the French style, for criminal
and civil cases of the old territory of New Spain.
It is worth remembering that cassation or nullity presupposes ac-
cepting the most radical idea of the separation of powers; the law is
the law and not just what the judges consider it should be. Cassa-
tion implies omnipotence of the law as a manifestation of the su-
preme will of the popular assemblies. On the contrary, judicial re-
view confers on the Tribunals not only the task of interpreting the
Law, but that of judging concerning its validity and its congruence
with a higher law, supposedly subtracted from the volatile oscilla-
tion of the parliamentary majorities.
In 1824 Mexico adopted the American federal republican sys-
tem, mainly as regards its political aspect, because insofar as the
jurisdictional system was concerned in the session of January 2nd
of that year the Mexican Constituent Lorenzo de Zavala-who ad-
vocated the Philadelphia model-asked if the (Federal) Constitu-
tional Act repealed the Spanish Constitution, because if that were
the case it was necessary to add many things, to which deputy Her-
rera replied that "The Spanish Constitution must be understood as
repealed only in as far as it is contrary to the Pact. .. ."
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ORIGINS OF MEXICO'S SUPREME COURT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UP TO THE MIDDLE OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The Supreme Court was created by the Federal Constitution of
October 1824, three years after the consummation of Mexico's In-
dependence. It was the result of a mixture of the influences of the
colonial, the Spanish, the French and the American systems.
At that time there were three main political trends: the one
favoring a monarchy headed by a Mexican; the partisans of a Euro-
pean Monarch; and those preferring a Republic.
First, a monarch was tried, and with the fall of Agustin de
Iturbide-in 1823-it became necessary to try the political system
of a Federal Republic, since several provinces which made up the
Mexican nation of that time had seceded and they had to be re-
united in a pact. The Constitution of the United States came to be
the model that best solved the political problem facing Mexico in
that crucial year; but the Mexican signatories of the Constitution
also adopted substantial parts of the Constitutions of Spain and
Columbia.
We must mention some other antecedents that influenced the ju-
ridical development of those first years: the draft of the Constitu-
tion of 1812 drawn up by Ignacio Lopez Rayon, Article 31 which
stated: "Each person shall be respected in his home as in a sacred
asylum, and the famous Law of Corpus Habeas of England shall be
administered. . . ."; and the fact that the works of Thomas Paine,
with the text of the articles of the Confederation of American Colo-
nies which had been recently become independent and that of some
constitutions of the confederated states circulated in Mexico. Like-
wise, it is a fact that many Mexican rebels who fought against
Spain took temporary refuge in the United States of America; Fray
Servando Teresa de Mier published an "Instructional Memoran-
dum" in Philadelphia in 1821, in which he admiringly explained
the federal republican system.
More significant was Vicente Rocafuerte's book, published in
1822 in Philadelphia, called "Necessary Ideas for Every Indepen-
dent People Who Want to Be Free": in which he set forth argu-
ments in favor of the federal republic and translated the United
States Constitution of 1787. On returning to Mexico, in the city of
Puebla, Rocafuerte published a booklet called "Brief Outline of the
Mexican Revolution" in 1823, in which he again commented and
translated the Constitution of the United States.
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With this background, it is understandable that the draft of the
Constitutional Act of the Mexican Federation of December 28,
1823 mentions the "Supreme Court of Justice" for the first time.
Several of the signees objected to the name. Teresa de Mier said
the word "Court" was not Spanish, but deputy Crescencio Rejon
said that it was in the dictionary; that it meant the same as Tribu-
nal and that it was the name used by "Our Sister Republics."
Since then, the name became a part of the legal tradition of
Mexico. Only during short periods of the nineteenth century, as
during the empire of Maximilian of Hapsburg, following the Euro-
pean model, a different denomination was used: that of "Supreme
Tribunal."
That document, of December 28, 1823 (Article 23) states "That
every inhabitant of the territory of the Mexican Federation has the
right to prompt administration of justice in order to protect his life,
person, honor, liberty and properties. . . ." and "[no one] may be
molested in his life and even in his properties and rights without
judicial intervention. .... "
That is, since its beginnings, the Supreme Court of Mexico has
had the fundamental task of protecting human rights. It has tried
to fulfill this task throughout its turbulent history
The convention of 1824 which drew up the first Federal Consti-
tution of Mexico, basis of the later two: that of 1857 and the pre-
sent one of 1917 when it created the Supreme Court as a constitu-
tional tribunal in charge of enforcing the Constitution and
fundamental human rights, also gave it the power of an
"Audiencia" that is, of a court of appeals and nullity within the
limits of the federal District and of the federal territories of that
period, Alta and Baja California, New Mexico, Colima and
Tlaxcala.
The same Constitution of 1824 created the Circuit Courts and
the District Courts, in the manner of the United States, but which,
with the Supreme Court, were understood as if forming the three
Spanish instances existing for every case. The Supreme Court was
made up of eleven justices appointed for life, designated by the leg-
islatures of the State. They had to be educated in the science of
law. Hispano-Americans residing in Mexico for more than five
years could be justices, as was the case of the Dominican Jacobo de
Villaurrutia.
Once the Supreme Court of Mexico had been created, it began
to work in 1825. Until middle of the nineteenth century, of the
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three branches of government, the judicial was the most stable and
solid. Because they were appointed for life and were required to
have vast legal knowledge of the old Spanish laws and the new Re-
publican ones-as well as a solid academy background, the justices
were highly respected.
Unquestionably, many of the first justices had read the Philadel-
phia Constitution and especially Hamilton, regardless of which they
did not dare consider that Mexico's Supreme Court had a power
unregulated by law. The case of Marbury v. Madison appears to
have been unknown in Mexico during the first years of the nine-
teenth century.
In 1836 Mexico tried a new Constitution-central and not fed-
eral-of the European type, similar to that given by Napoleon in
1977 (that of the VIII year), that created a special body with a
political nature empowered to declare the unconstitutionality of
laws. This body was a fourth power, in addition to the three classi-
cal ones, called "Supreme Conservating Power," modeled after the
"Sendt Conservator" of the Abate Sieyes of France.
Under that Constitution, the law of March 13, 1840 was de-
clared unconstitutional, which shows that during the first half of
the nineteenth century, a type of "Judicial Review" was already
beginning to be accepted in Mexico, but applying European juridi-
cal notions and not those of Justice Marshall. When the Federal
government was reinstated in 1846 and the 1824 Constitution was
dusted off again and became enforceable, there was a favorable at-
mosphere toward the judicial branch being able to examine the un-
constitutionality of laws (Judicial Review). On the one hand, there
was the before mentioned experience of the Supreme Conservating
Power provided for in a constitution with a French influence and on
the other hand, the book "Democracy in America" by Alexis de
Tocqueville, had already been widely circulated and appears to
have reached Mexico in 1837. It should be noted that the Spanish
translation of Sdinchez de Bustamante was reprinted in Mexico in
1855, the year in which the convention that drew up the 1857
Magna Carta was convened. Furthermore, although to a lesser de-
gree, the classic work "The Federalist" circulated in fragmentary
form. This influence strengthened the idea of implementing judicial
review in Mexico and of expressly giving the Supreme Court the
power to declare unconstitutional laws null and void, but referred
to concrete cases.
However the procedure used by the American courts was not
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clear in Mexican legal circles. Obedience to the constitution above
the ordinary laws of the Congress was stipulated in the text of the
Philadelphia Constitution. But the Mexican justices considered a
clear, precise text necessary, that would empower the courts to de-
clare laws null and void.
This explains why the judicial review in Mexico was the creation
of politicians and legislators and not of the judges. What most im-
pressed the Mexican politicians and jurists of the nineteenth cen-
tury, who hoped to incorporate it into law, was de Tocqueville's
central idea concerning the American judicial review and its dif-
fused and incidental form stated in the following terms: "When the
judge attacks a law in an obscure debate and concerning its partic-
ular application, he in part hides the importance of the attack from
the public view. The purpose of his decision is only to defend a
particular interest, but the law only feels wounded by chance ...
Only gradually and under the repeated effects of jurisprudence does
it succumb. . . ." This idea of de Tocqueville influenced the politi-
cians of the period, particularly the so-called liberals, disillusioned
with European trends.
This explains why in 1841 Manuel Crescencio Rejon was able to
create the "amparo" suit, not at the national level, but only for the
State of Yucatan, whereby human rights or guarantees were pro-
tected and the courts of that State were able to pass on the uncon-
stitutionality of the laws of the State. Later, in 1847, the liberal
jurist Mariano Otero, while being a member of Congress, proposed
Article 25 of the constitutional text of the Amendments Act, which
amended the Constitution of 1824, in the following terms: "The
Courts of the Federation shall protect any inhabitant of the Repub-
lic in the exercise and conservation of the rights granted him in this
Constitution and the constitutional law against all attacks of the
legislative and executive powers, whether of the federation or of the
States, said courts being limited to provide their protection in the
particular case the process is concerned with, without making a
general declaration regarding the motivating law." To date, this
formula known as the "Otero Formula" continues being the back-
bone of "amparo" proceedings, as the confrontation of different
branches of government are thereby avoided, since the decision
does not create a general, abstract situation, benefitting even those
who did not ask for protection from the federal courts.
With this dissimilar background, we can understand why a well-
known Mexican author says that "The legal transplant of judicial
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review of the constitutionality of acts of authority and specifically
of the constitutionality of the laws, forged in the juridical tradition
of common law or of Anglo-American law, into a hispanic back-
ground of more than three centuries, belonging to the Roman-Ca-
nonic system, produced an institution different from the American
model while a specific procedural instrument was established devel-
oped in special ordainments that deviate from the United States
judicial review which, as has been profoundly asserted by the dis-
tinguished writer of treatises, J.A.C. Grant, is applied through nu-
merous procedural instruments, and therefore constitutes a princi-
ple and not a particular route."
I could not end this brief sketch of "amparo" without mentioning
another institution that influenced it, although not directly; habeas
corpus, that was developed in the United States due to the influence
of the English law of 1697.
The expression "amparo" is originally Spanish. It was used dur-
ing the period when Mexico was a colony of Spain, an in the nine-
teenth century it was used constantly as an "interdicto posesorio"
that is, an order to protect the right of possession over a given prop-
erty or land. Because of this, although the transplantation of judi-
cial review from the United States and the Hispanic tradition in-
herited from the colonial period produced a hybrid institution, the
name of that institution is "castilian, evocative and legendary" as
accurately put forth by the well known Mexican constitutionalist,
Dr. Felipe Tena Ramirez.
It was from 1847 on that the "amparo" suit consolidated and
obtained the popular prestige it has maintained to date; and it has
been an integral part of the Mexican Constitution of 1857 and
1917, the last one presently in force. It has four main
characteristics:
a) It was created as an autonomous legal proceeding.
b) Only Federal Courts can hear this proceeding or case.
c) The proceeding guarantees people in the enjoyment and satis-
faction of their rights and of the guarantees provided for in
the Federal Constitution against authorities of all classes: fed-
eral, state, municipal, and against acts of the executive, legis-
lative and judiciary, and
d) The decision of the court granting the "amparo" and protec-
tion of the Federation in favor of the complainant or ag-
grieved party does not have general effects, but rather only
benefits the one filing for "amparo," whom it removes from
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the influence of the law.
"Amparo" proceedings' primary function is the protection of
rights of freedom and property, similar to that of habeas corpus
and the judicial review of the United States; because of the Spanish
and French influence, it also fulfills functions of federal cassation;
because of the American influence, it can be used to declare the
unconstitutionality of laws, both federal and local, and it maintains
the monopoly of this function since in Mexico the diffused control
of the American model was never accepted. On the other hand, it
fulfills functions similar to those of the French contentious-adminis-
trative system when it hears acts or resolutions of the federal or
state administrations.
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857
The amparo suit achieved its definite constitutional form when it
became part of the fundamental of law in 1857; following the inter-
val occupied by Maximilian's transient empire, it left the realm of
legal theory for the concrete realities of the courtroom. Because of
the importance of this achievement of the constituent convention of
1856-1857, the recommendations of its drafting committee are very
revealing.
Amparo is referred to as perhaps the most important reform rec-
ommended to the convention. The drafting committee confined its
remarks, however, to applying the action to the maintenance of the
federal system. The arguments were based upon the success of judi-
cial review in the United States and the dismal history of failure of
the political systems of constitutional defense in Mexico.
With the establishment of amparo in the constitution of 1857,
political devices of constitutional defense were finally abandoned.
The actual implementation of amparo, however, was delayed by the
Three Year's War, the French intervention, and during 1864-1867,
the empire of Maximilian.
Without examining the important period of 1857 to 1912, we will
go on to that of the Constitution in force from 1917, which was 70
years old on February 5, 1987.
"Amparo" which for Rej6n, Otero and its other creators, already
had the primary function of safekeeper of human rights, has
evolved until it constitutes a complex multifaceted legal proceeding.
Since the Amendments Act of 1840, the Supreme Court has in-
sisted on the defense of "Freedom, liberty, property and equality,"
not only as concerns acts of the federal authorities, but also against
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acts of the state authorities. This is why it has been said, and justi-
fiably so, that in our country, the federal judiciary developed histor-
ically with the main purpose of bringing justice to the people and
protecting human rights, before that of interpreting the laws or
maintaining particular principles of legal techniques. This assertion
is still valid for every federal judge.
Thus we can speak of an historical continuity that began in the
last century. Since 1847, the organization of federal justice has
been closely tied to the "amparo" suit and its evolution. For this
reason, by expanding the sphere of action of "amparo" and making
an examination of the legality of every possible act of authority, the
federal judiciary has also had to vary its structure in order to be
able to meet an increasingly larger and more diversified work load.
For example, the lawsuits against acts of the public administration
and the examination of legality in all judicial matters and in labor
and agrarian disputes, have acquired ever greater importance.
Furthermore, Mexico's Supreme Court has three different func-
tions that in other countries are performed by three different judi-
cial bodies, such as the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassa-
tion and the Administrative Contentious Court of the Court of
State Counsel.
Within this general framework of evolution, we must note the
enormous importance of the amendments related to the creation of
the Collegiate Circuit Court, published in the "Official Gazette" of
February 19, 1951, which were inspired by the proposed drafts of
1944 and 1945 and in the amendment carried out in the United
States in 1891, whereby the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
were created with the purpose of freeing the Supreme Court of that
country from a large number of cases. The Circuit Courts in Mex-
ico became new organs in the structure of the Federal Judiciary
together with the three that existed since the Constitution of Octo-
ber 1824.
Prior to 1951 the Court was entrusted with the impossible task of
solving-as well as other important matters-the entirety of the di-
rect "amparo" cases and the appeals for review that arrived from
each state of the nation as well as the appeals for fiscal review
against decisions of the Federal Tax Court. In order to deal with
the backlog in the Supreme Court, there could only be three
solutions:
The first would have consisted in restricting the legal basis for
"amparo" proceedings, a solution contrary to the wishes of the con-
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stituent of Queretaro and to the aim of Mexico's Federal Justice
system, since its origins of widely protecting individual rights.
The second solution would have been to increase the number of
chambers of the Supreme Court; but this measure was also con-
trary to the principle of the constituent of Queretaro, who consid-
ered that the Supreme Court should always function "en banc."
Also the number of justices had reached twenty-one and it was not
advisable to continue increasing it. Otero had already warned of
the dangers of a large number of justices.
The third solution consisted in creating a new type of "Amparo"
court; the Collegiate Circuit Court.
The work of the first Circuit Courts was fruitful, since in 1950
the Supreme Court had 37,881 cases pending resolution, and by
1955 this figure had dropped to 10,086. However, by 1965 the
backlog had increased to 18,949 cases, which demanded an urgent
solution to the problem. With this in mind, President Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz petitioned the Supreme Court to propose the amendments
that in its opinion were necessary to solve the problem, as no one
better than the Court itself could know the answer.
The preliminary project of amendments was made in the Su-
preme Court and, with all due respect from the Executive, it was
sent to Congress. This was the origin of the amendments to the
Federal Constitution that were published in the "Official Gazette"
of October 25, 1967 and that became effective on October 27,
1968.
The 1968 changes had qualitative assumptions, such as that of
continuing with the tradition that the Supreme Court be the sole
interpreter of the Constitution, but fundamentally quantitative
points of view were used, such as those concerning the amount of
the lawsuit or the nature of the sentence passed on alleged delin-
quents in order to determine the distribution of jurisdictions be-
tween the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts and the District
Courts.
The creation of the Collegiate Circuit Courts constituted a neces-
sary step toward reducing the excessive volume of business entering
the Supreme Court and, consequently, it speeded up the adminis-
tration of justice and brought it closer to the people through the
decentralization of the related organs. However, the system adopted
as to the distribution of jurisdiction, which essentially continues to
exist today, has serious deficiencies. In fact, a system where in
many hypotheses the jurisdictions are distributed between bodies of
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different hierarchies, not by reason of the nature of the suit but
rather in attention to other motives, such as the quantity, is techni-
cally defective.
The passage of the years made the insufficiency of the measures
adopted obvious as regards the organization and division of juris-
diction, in order to avoid the backlog in the chambers and in the
Plenary Court. Since 1968 matters of an indeterminate value,
within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, could be resolved by the
Administrative Chamber if in the Justice's opinion the case was of
great importance for the nation's interest. Thus, the Second Cham-
ber, by using its discretion, could hear certain cases. Starting from
this possibility, novel in our law, but similar to American "certio-
rari," the power of the attraction was progressively expanded in
favor of the first, third, and fourth chambers, as well as the plenary
or full court, not only in order to attract cases of extreme impor-
tance, but also in order to be able to disencumber themselves from
cases they considered to be unimportant.
It also became obvious that the Supreme Court was performing
functions of a Court of Appeals or of Cassation, improper to its
high dignity which derives from its function of being the exclusive
and definitive interpreter of the mandates of the Constitution.
With his legal background (he is a well-known writer of Consti-
tutional Law and was a professor of this subject for many years at
the National University of Mexico), President Miguel de la Madrid
knew of the inconveniences of the system adopted for distribution
of jurisdictions between the different courts of the federal judiciary
and sent a draft of amendments to the Mexican Political Constitu-
tion to Congress in order to give the Supreme Court exclusive juris-
diction over cases in which the constitutionality of laws, rules and
international treaties were questioned, leaving other cases it pres-
ently hears to be solved by the Circuit Courts. The constitutional
amendments were approved by the Constituent Assembly and be-
came effective on January 15, 1988.
Some years ago Mexico celebrated the sesquicentennial of the
Constitution of 1824 and in 1987 we celebrated the seventieth anni-
versary of the Magna Carta that presently governs us. These occa-
sions gave us the opportunity to ponder the past with the aim of
better understanding the legacy left us by those men of wisdom and
insight which initiated the institutions that have given us peace and
freedom. During 1987, the bicentennial of the constitution of Phila-
delphia was commemorated throughout the world and not only in
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the United States. This document, that for over two centuries has
governed the life of this country, has shown itself to be a flexible
instrument capable of answering the challenges and profound
changes that have occurred in the last eighty years of this turbulent
century. This bicentennial of that constitution is also a proper occa-
sion to reflect on similarities and differences of our unique historical
and political legacies.
The differences between the constitutions and the judicial sys-
tems of both countries derive from our different colonial past and
from the cultural, social and political heritage bequeathed to us by
our ancestors.
A study of our consitutional history shows us that Mexico and
the United States are united by much more than a common border
of over 3,000 kilometers; we are united by something more consis-
tent than a simple geographic accident; we have similar political
and juridical institutions that in truth unite us, some of Mexico's
with deep roots in institutions of the United States.
Those of us who have dedicated the better part of our lives to the
study, practice, adjudication or administration of law, are well
aware of several common values we share.
Let me review some of those common values we share. We share,
among other things, a deep belief in what the fundamental doctri-
nal principles and basic institution of government should be. The
doctrinal principles we hold in common are fundamental to our
ways of life. The founding fathers of both our nations, those in the
United States in 1787 and those in Mexico in 1824, placed faith in
a system of government based on a written, rigid constitution and
in the subordination of all legislation and public officials to written
law. Both groups of founding fathers wanted to create governments
that would limit the potential of the tyranny that our ancestors so
definitively rejected and made them embark on wars of indepen-
dence. In both our countries we have placed faith in popular repre-
sentation of republican government.
Finally, both our countries share a deep faith in the ideal and in
the triumph of justice; a profound faith in the institutions that have
given us peace and freedom; but above all, our two countries have a
deep faith in liberty, without which there can be neither freedom,
nor justice, nor peace.
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